ABSTRACT Telecare Medicine Information System (TMIS)'s security importance attracts a lot of attention these days. Whatever the security of TMIS improves, its application becomes wider. To address this requirement, recently, Li et al. proposed a new privacy-preserving RFID authentication protocol for TMIS. After that, Zhou et al. and also Benssalah et al. presented their scheme, which is not secure, and they presented their new authentication protocol and claim that their proposal can provide higher security for TMIS applications. In this stream, Zheng et al. proposed a novel authentication protocol with application in smart campus, including TMIS. In this paper, we present an efficient impersonation and replay attacks against Zheng et al. with the success probability of 1 and a desynchronization attack which is applicable against all of the rest three mentioned protocols with the success probability of 1 − 2 −n , where n is the protocols parameters length. After that, we proposed a new protocol despite these protocols can resist the attacks presented in this paper and also other active and passive attacks. Our proposed protocol's security is also done both informally and formally through the Scyther tool.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the applications of Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) is in e-health and medical care systems. RFID is a technology for the identification of objects using radio waves. Three main components of an RFID system are tags, readers and a database for the access and authentication management. There are three different types of tags mainly attending to the signal's distance and its price: active, semi-passive and passive. Active tags are the most expensive and are able to establish a connection within a reader by itself. Semi-passive tags can either, use the power of a reader's signal or communicate within a reader without the reader's signal; while passive tags are the cheapest and need a reader's signal to communicate with it. The connection between the tag and the reader is generally considered as wireless and insecure while the connection between the reader and the server/database could be a permanent connection based on for example fiber optic as the media or wireless and insecure. In the latter case,
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Sabah Mohammed. the reader is called mobile. A mobile reader provides more flexibility and could be used in a wider variety of applications. A protocol that supports a mobile reader could be appropriate for Telecare Medicine Information System (TMIS) where for example a nurse should move from a patient to another patient and track their critical data. However, the security of such a protocol could be very vital due to the patient safety and the sensitivity of his/her personal data that should not be revealed to any unauthorized party.
A. RELATED WORK AND MOTIVATION
In the field of health care, similar to other applications, the privacy of the users and the security of their information is a very critical issue. The user in this application could be a doctor, a nurse or a patient and their information could vary from their personal data to the history of their medical services and so on. New technologies, such as RFID and the Internet of things (IoT) can improve the quality and the speed of a medical service which is provided for a patient and also provide enough information for medical service providers to provide better service for their patients. However, as it has been already mentioned, besides these benefits any new technology has its own risk and concerns. For RFID and IoT, illegal access to the system information is a potential risk which can cause many problems varies from compromising the user's privacy to given wrong medical service to a patient which lead to his/her death. Hence, during the last decade, many researchers tried to address these concerns by providing various protocols for access control, authentication and key management in such applications, e.g. [1] - [8] , [8] - [11] , [11] - [13] . However, the later analyzes performed in the field of security analysis of those protocols [14] - [19] show that the research community has not yet reached a comprehensive secure protocol. In this paper, we target the security analysis of some recent protocols in this category.
To address these concerns, Srivastava et al. [20] proposed a hash-based mutual RFID authentication protocol in Telecare Medicine Information System (TMIS) and claimed security against active and passive attacks such as forgery, traceability, replay, and desynchronization attack. However, later in [21] , Li et al. pointed out the security vulnerabilities of Srivastava et al. [20] including having a weak login phase which increases the adversary's advantage to a successful login, its weakness against the stolen/lost reader and also having low efficiency. To remedy these flaws, they also presented a new protocol. Benssalah et al. [28] showed the security flaws of Li et al. protocol including its vulnerability against desynchronization and impersonation attacks and also not ensuring the protocol's transferred messages integrity and also data privacy and also proposed an improved version. In addition, Zhou et al. [22] showed weaknesses of Li et al. protocol and proposed a protocol, used residue theorem and also hash functions as building blocks of their proposed proposal and claimed to be suitable for TMIS applications. Mir and Nikooghadam [23] tried to employ biometric in their authentication with key agreement protocol for TMIS. Later, Abbasinezhad-Mood and Nikooghadam [24] tried to provide data protection in TMIS using elliptic curve based cryptography (ECC) to employ. However, it is yet may not be possible to implement such a cryptosystem in a passive RFID tag with very constrained environments. Very recently, Tan [25] presented a new secure delegation-based authentication protocol by using the identity-based cryptography for TMIS. In addition, Li et al. [26] proposed a chaotic mapbased remote authentication scheme for TMIS. In order to address the need for the security protocols in smart campus including TMIS, Zheng et al. [27] also proposed a new authentication scheme.
B. MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS
The main contribution of this paper is two folds. At first, we consider the security of some of those protocols that are proposed for mobile readers and show that they do not provide the desired security. More precisely, we show that Zheng et al. [27] protocol suffers from replay attacks. In addition, assuming that the adversary can control the time setting of the readers, then it is possible to apply desynchronization attack against Li et al. [21] protocol and its successors.
Secondly, we propose a secure authentication protocol for mobile readers that only uses a hash function and bitwise XOR operation, which is more realistic to be implemented in a passive tag than other proposals such as Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and other public key based solutions. Moreover, we analyze its security against various attacks in the context such as desynchronization, traceability, secret disclosure, and impersonation attacks and show its security against these attacks. We also verify the correctness of our protocol using a formal approach through Scyther tool.
C. PAPER ORGANIZATION
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section II, we briefly review Zheng et our new proposed protocol and its security proof respectively and finally this paper concludes in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
The notations which are used in this paper are represented in Table 1 .
A. ZHENG et al. PROTOCOL FOR SMART CAMPUS
To address the need for the security protocols in smart campus including TMIS, recently, Zheng et al. [27] proposed a new authentication protocol represented in Fig. 1 and proceeds as below:
1) The reader starts a session and sends Query message along with its local timestamp T 1 to the tag. 2) Once the tag receives the message, it generates a random number R t and computes Li et al. [21] pointed out the security vulnerabilities of Srivastava et al. [20] including having a weak login phase which increases the adversary's advantage to successful login, its weakness against the stolen/lost reader and also having low efficiency. To remedy these flaws, they presented a new protocol which as illustrated in Fig. 2 , proceeds as below in two phases:
1) BOOT READER PHASE
Since Li et al. designed their protocol to be employed in Telecare Medicine Information System, take in to account the boot reader phase. To boot the reader, the TMIS staff must: 1) input the reader identifier RID k and the reader password RPW k ; 2) The reader computes
and checks whether V k ? = V k is or not. If it holds, the reader successfully booted otherwise the reader stops the protocol process.
2) AUTHENTICATION PHASE
1) The reader starts this phase by generating random number R r and computing
and sending them along time stamp T 1 to the tag; 2) Once the tag received the message, it: • generates another random number R t and computes
• and sends ID k , C, D and T 2 to the reader. 3) Upon receipt the message, the reader:
• computes T 1 − T 2 where T 1 is the reader's current time stamp and checks whether T 1 − T 2 ≤ T is or not. If it is not, it aborts the protocol process and otherwise sends RID k , A, B , T 1 , ID k , C, D and T 2 to the server. 4) When the server receives the message, computes T 3 − T 2 where T 3 is the server's current timestamp and checks whether T 3 − T 2 ≤ T is or not. If it is not, the server aborts the protocol process and otherwise continues as below;
and checks whether B * ?
= B, if it does not hold, stops the protocol otherwise continues as below;
and checks whether D * ?
= D, if it does not hold, stops the protocol otherwise continues as below.
•
) and updates its records as follows:
• updates x j and x j−1 as x j+1 = h(x j ⊕ R * r ) and x j respectively;
• updates s j and s j−1 as s j+1 = h(s j ⊕ R * t ) and s j respectively;
• and finally sends E, F and G to the reader; 5) Once the reader receives the message, it:
) and checks whether E * ?
= E is or not. If it is not stops the protocol's process otherwise the Data's integrity successfully verified and it successfully authenticates the server;
• updates its related records i.e. x j as x j+1 = h(x j ⊕ R r );
• and sends G to the tag. 6) Upon receipt the message, the tag computes G * = h(s j ID k T 2 R t h(s j ⊕ R t )) and checks whether
If it is not, stops the protocol process otherwise successfully authenticates the reader and updated its s j to s j+1 = h(s j ⊕ R t ). 
C. BENSSALAH et al. PROTOCOL FOR TMIS
Benssalah et al. [28] showed the security flaws of Li et al. protocol including its vulnerability against desynchronization and impersonation attacks and also not ensuring the protocol's transferred messages integrity and also data privacy. All of these weaknesses lead to not employing this protocol in TMIS systems. They also tried to propose a new improved version of the Li et al.'s protocol and claim their protocol have a suitable level of security. As illustrated in Fig. 3 , their protocol works as follows in two phases:
1) BOOT READER PHASE
Since Benssalah et al. designed their protocol to be employed in Telecare Medicine Information System, take in to account the boot reader phase. To boot the reader, same as Li et al. protocol, the TMIS staff must:
• input the reader identifier RID k and reader password RPW k ;
• the reader computes
If it holds the reader successfully booted otherwise the reader stops the protocol process.
2) AUTHENTICATION PHASE
1) The reader starts this phase by generating random number R r and sending it to the tag; 2) Once the tag received the message, it:
• generates another random number R t and computes
• and sends A, B and C to the reader.
3) Upon receipt the message, the reader:
• computes T 2 − T 1 where T 2 is the reader's current time stamp and checks whether T 2 − T 1 ≤ T is or not. If it is not, the reader aborts the protocol process and otherwise computes D = h(RID k T 2 R r );
• and sends A, C, D, T 1 , T 2 , ID k j , R r to the server. 4) When the server receives the message, computes T 3 − T 2 where T 3 is the server's current time stamp and checks whether T 3 − T 2 ≤ T is or not. If it is not, the server aborts the protocol process and otherwise continues as below;
= D, if it does not hold, stops the protocol otherwise continues as below;
• checks whether C * ? = C, if it does not hold, stops the protocol otherwise continues as below;
• generates R s and computes
• After successful tag and reader authentication, the server updates its related records from the reader and tags as follows: -updates s j and s j−1 as s j+1 = h(s j ⊕ R * t ⊕ R s ) and s j respectively; -updates ID k j as ID k j+1 = h(ID k j R s R * t ); • and sends D T , E, F, G and T 3 to the reader; 5) Once the reader receives the message, it:
• computes T 4 − T 3 where T 4 is the reader's current time stamp and checks whether T 4 − T 3 ≤ T is or not. If it is not, the server aborts the protocol process and otherwise continues as below;
• obtains Data as F ⊕ RID k ⊕ R r ;
• computes G * = h(Data R r T 3 ) and checks whether G * ?
= G is or not. If it is not, stops the protocol's process otherwise the Data's integrity successfully verified and it successfully authenticates the server;
• and sends D T , E, T 2 , T 3 and T 4 to the tag. 6) Upon receipt the message, the tag:
• computes T 5 −T 4 where T 5 is the tag's current time stamp and checks whether
If it is not, the server aborts the protocol process and otherwise continues as below;
• computes E * = h(s j ID k j R * s R t ) and checks whether E * ?
= E. If it is not, stops the protocol process otherwise successfully authenticates the reader and updates its s j to
D. ZHOU et al. PROTOCOL FOR TMIS
Zhou et al. [22] due to address the weaknesses of Li et al. protocol and also provide the strong privacy preservation for their proposed scheme which makes it suitable for TMIS applications, used residue theorem and also hash functions as building blocks of their proposed proposal. They also designed their protocol in such a way despite the Li et al. and also Benssalah et al. the reader identifier RID k and also the tag's identifier ID k have not been transferred in plain text form. Their proposed protocol as depicted in Fig. 4 proceeds in three phases of pre-phase, boot reader phase, and authentication phase.
1) PRE-PHASE
In this phase, the protocol parties generate and store their related secrets. Precisely:
• The server generates and stores four prime numbers p,q,g and h as its private keys and n = p.q and m = g.h as its public keys.
• The tag generates and stores its identifier ID k and its secret value s j . Beside on this, the tag saves the n and shares (ID k , s j , s j−1 ) and the hash function h(.) with the server.
• The reader stores its identifier RID k and its secret value x j and also
as one way hash function. The reader shares RID k , x j and x j−1 with the server.
2) BOOT READER PHASE
Since Zhou et al. designed their protocol to be employed in Telecare Medicine Information System, take in to account the boot reader phase. To boot the reader, the TMIS staff must:
• input the reader identifier RID k and the reader password RPW k ;
• the reader computes V k = W K ⊕ RID k ⊕ RPW k , and checks whether V k ? = V k is or not. If it holds, the reader successfully booted otherwise the reader stops the protocol process.
3) AUTHENTICATION PHASE
1) The reader starts this phase by generating a random number R r1 and sending it along time stamp T 1 to the tag; 2) Once the tag received the message, it:
• generates another random number R t and computes x = ID k ⊕T 1 ⊕s j ⊕R t , A = (R r1 x) 2 mod n, B = R 2 t mod n and C = (R r1 s j ) 2 mod n; • and sends A, B and C to the reader. 3) Upon receipt the message, the reader:
• generates another random number R r2 and computes
• and sends A, B, C, T 1 , D, E, F, R r1 and G to the server.
4) When the server receives the message, computes T 2 − T 1 where T 2 is the server's current timestamp and checks whether T 2 − T 1 ≤ T is or not. If it is not, the server aborts the protocol process and otherwise continues as below:
• by using Chinese Reminder Theorem (CRT) and g and h solves the equations F = (R r1 x j ) 2 mod m , D = (R r1 y) 2 mod m and E = (R r2 ) 2 mod m and obtains x j and y and (R r2 1 , R r2 2 , R r2 3 , R r2 4 ) where x j and y are uniquely retrieved by using R r1 from four equations.
• computes RID k = y ⊕ T 1 ⊕ R r2 m ⊕ x j and searches the tags related records by using RID k as index which in the worst case it only occurs four times.
• If any related record is founded, checks whether h(RID k R r1 A T 1 ) ?
= G, if it holds the sever can obtain RID k , x j and x j−1 and checks whether x j ? = x j or x j−1 . If it holds, the server successfully authenticates the reader and otherwise it stops the authentication process.
• by using Chinese Reminder Theorem (CRT), solves the equations C = (R r1 s j ) 2 mod n, A = (R r1 x) 2 mod n and B = (R t ) 2 mod n and obtains x and s j and (R t1 , R t2 , R t3 , R t4 ); • computes ID k = x ⊕ T 1 ⊕ s j ⊕ R tm and searches the tags related records by using ID k as index which in the worst case it only occurs four times.
• If any related record is founded, the server can obtain ID k , s j and s j−1 and checks whether s j ? = s j or s j−1 . If it holds, the server successfully authenticates the tag and otherwise, it stops the authentication process.
• After successful tag and reader authentication, the server updates its related records from the reader and tags as follows: and s j−1 respectively;
• informs the related records of tag and the data of tag Data to the reader as follows:
• and sends H , I and J to the reader; 5) Once the reader receives the message, it:
• computes I * = h(Data R r2 ) and checks whether I * ?
= I is or not. If it is not, the reader stops the protocol's process otherwise the Data's integrity successfully verified and it successfully authenticates the server;
• updates its related records i.e. x j , V k and W k as
respectively where x j used them is updated.
• and sends J to the tag. 6) Upon receipt the message, the tag computes J * = h(s j ⊕ ID k ⊕ R t ⊕ h(s j ⊕ R t )) and checks whether
If it is not, stops the protocol process otherwise successfully authenticates the reader and updates its s j to h(s j ⊕ R t ).
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROTOCOLS A. ADVERSARY MODEL
We consider an active adversary who can stand between the tag and the reader or the reader and the back-end server, given that the Zhou et al.'s protocol targets mobile readers and assumed that both the channels of reader-tag and readerback-end server are all insecure [22, Sec. 4.2] . In addition, if it is required, we assume that the adversary can control the time stamp of the mobile reader, which is not an unrealistic assumption and it is possible to change the time setting of the mobile reader.
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF ZHENG et al. PROTOCOL
In the case of Zheng et al.'s protocol [27] , the protocol's parties do not update shared values. Hence we cannot desynchronize them and it is better to try to impersonate a protocol party. An option is to impersonate the server and the reader toward the tag. The reason comes from the fact the tag has no local time and any time suggested from the reader is acceptable for the tag. In this protocol, any adversary can impersonate the reader to the tag as it is explained here. To end this, the adversary can eavesdrop transferred messages in a legitimate session between the tag, the reader and the server and stores tuple T 1 , T 2 , N 5 = h(ID k T 2 ). Now, at any desired time, to impersonate the reader, the adversary sends a query with T 1 to the tag. The tag sends its response as (N 1 , N 2 , R t ) , where N 1 = h(ID k T 1 R t ), N 2 = R t ⊕ T 1 and R t is a fresh random value generated by the tag for this session. Now the adversary returns the stored N 5 = h(ID k T 2 ) and T 2 to the tag and will be definitely authenticated by the adversary. The flaw comes from the fact the server does not randomize its answer by the randomness contributed by the tag and the reader. This attack can be considered as tag traceability attack also which compromises the tag holder anonymity which shows that the protocol does not preserve the user privacy.
The above-mentioned impersonation attack which is also replay attack is fair enough to rule out any application of the Zheng et al.'s protocol [27] . However, if the adversary can force the reader time to a specific time, following the adversary model explained in Section III-A, then it can impersonate the reader and the tag set toward the server. It should be noted such an attack is of practical interest and in literature, a class of protocols called distance bounding protocols, e.g. see [29] - [32] for this concept, aim to withstand such an attack. Hence, it is important to defend an attack in which the adversary eavesdrops the generated messages by the tag and the reader in a location/time and use them in another location/time. The target of the attack procedure which is explained here against Zheng et al. ' s protocol is such an attack. Assuming that the adversary is aiming to be authenticated by the server at a specified time T 1 , the attack could be as follows:
1) Similarly, we assume that the adversary changes the reader's time, i.e forces it to be a T 1 which is the target time for passing the server. 2) We assume that there will be a session between the reader and the tag next, where the reader starts a session and sends Query message along with its local timestamp T 1 to the tag. 3) Once the tag receives the message, it generates a random number R t and computes N 1 = h(ID k T 1 R t ), N 2 = R t ⊕ T 1 and send them along R t to the reader. 4) When the reader receives the message, it computes R * t = N 2 ⊕ T 1 and verifies whether R * t ? = R t is or not. If it is not, aborts the protocol otherwise computes N 3 = h(RID k T 1 R t ) and send it along with N 1 , T 1 and R t to the database. 5) Similarly, the adversary, who stands in the channel between the reader and the server, blocks the transferred message ( N 3 , N 1 , T 1 , R t ) but stores it for the latter purposes. 6) The adversary reset/allow-to-be-reset the reader's time to the correct time which is synchronized with the server's time. 7) At appropriate time T 1 , the adversary sends the stored messages from Step 5 to the server. The messages/tag/reader are authenticated by the server.
Moreover, it is easy to impersonate the server also. To impersonate the server, it would be enough to eavesdrop the transferred messages from the server to the tag and the reader in a legitimate session which is the tuple (
, then returns it to the reader in a later session. More precisely, based on the Step 5 of this protocol, to authenticate the server, the reader using = N 4 . Given RID k is a static value, the reader authenticates the database (impersonated by the adversary) and sends N 5 along with T 2 to the tag. Now, based on the Step 6 of the protocol, the tag also using received T 2 , computes h(ID k T 2 ) and verifies whether h(ID k T 2 ) ? = N 5 and authenticates the server and the reader. One may argue that the attack can be fixed if the reader also evaluates the received T 2 , to be in a reasonable duration from T 1 . However, in this case, also we can apply the attack in the given adversary model. More precisely, the adversary at the first forces the reader time to a time close to T 2 and then applies the attack.
The structure of the transferred messages has other weaknesses also but we omit them because we think the presented replay attack against the protocol is fair enough to rule out any possible application of this protocol.
C. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF ZHOU et al. AND RELATED PROTOCOLS
Following the given adversary model in Section III-A, we propose a desynchronization attack against the Zhou et al.'s protocol. The attack procedure is as follows:
1) The adversary changes the reader's time, e.g. forces it to be a day ahead of the current time of the server; 2) We assume that there will be a session between the reader and the tag next, where the reader starts this phase by generating random number R r1 and sending it along its current timestamp T 1 to the tag; 3) Once the tag received the message, it generates a random number R t to compute A, B and C and sends them to the reader, where 2 mod n, B = R 2 t mod n and C = (R r1 s j ) 2 mod n. 4) Upon receipt A, B and C, the reader generates another random number R r2 , computes y, D, H and sends A,B,C,T 1 ,D,E,F,R r1 and G to the server where:
5) The adversary, who stands in the channel between the reader and the server, blocks the transferred message but stores it for the later purposes. 6) The adversary reset/allow-to-be-reset the reader's time to the correct time which is synchronized with the server's time. 7) We again assume that there will be a session between the reader and the tag next, where the reader starts the session by generating random number R r1 and sending it along its current timestamp T 1 to the tag; 8) Once the tag received the message, it generates a random number R t to compute A, B and C and sends them to the reader, where
9) Upon receipt A , B and C , the reader generates another random number R r2 , computes y , D , H and sends A ,B ,C ,T 1 ,D ,E ,F ,R r1 and G to the server where:
The adversary does not intercept the rest of the process.
Hence, after authenticating the tag and the reader successfully, the server updates its related records from the reader and tags as follows:
• If x j = x j , which without loss of generality we assume that it is the case, updates x j and x j−1 as h(x j ⊕ R r2 ) and x j respectively;
• If s j = s j , assuming it is, updates s j and s j−1 as h(s j ⊕ R t ) and s j respectively; 11) The reader also updates its related records i.e. x j , V k and
respectively where x j used them is updated. 12) The tag updates s j to h(s j ⊕ R t ). 13) From now on, up to the time predefined time T 1 , the adversary blocks any message from the reader and equivalently from the tag, to server. Hence, there will not be any authentication between the server and the reader/tag and their shared records remain fixed. 14) At appropriate time T 1 , the adversary sends the stored messages from Step 5 to the server. The messages/tag/reader are authenticated based on the old records of the server. 15) Given that x j = x j and s j = s j , where x j and s j are the secret values used in the sent messages by the adversary, the server updates x j and x j−1 as h(x j ⊕ R r2 ) and x j respectively; it also updates s j and s j−1 as h(s j ⊕ R t ) and s j respectively. Given that Pr(R r2 = R r2 ) = 2 −n and Pr(R t = R t ) = 2 −n then Pr(h(x j ⊕R r2 ) = h(x j ⊕R r2 )) = 2 −n and Pr(h(s j ⊕R t ) = h(s j ⊕ R t )) = 2 −n , where we considered the length of all parameters to be n bits. These show that the reader and the tags record of x j and s j respectively do not match any of their records in the server and the server will not authenticate them anymore, which means they have been desynchronized. The success probability of the given attack is 1 − 2 −n .
It should be noted this attack is applicable to Li et al.'s protocol [21] almost as it is. In addition, beside Zhou et al. [22] , Benssalah et al. [28] also analyzed the Li et al.'s protocol [21] and proposed an improved version for it, also targeting a secure authentication over a telecare medicine information system. Given that in a telecare medicine information system the reader should be mobile, it is possible to apply almost an identical attack against their protocol also, i.e. desynchronize the reader and the tag from the server. In addition, in Benssalah et al. protocol, each tag has an identifier ID k which is updated after each successful run of the protocol. Given that we can desynchronize the reader from the server, the tag will never update its identifier hereafter. Hence, it is also possible to compromise the tag/tag-holder anonymity in that protocol. 
IV. PROPOSED PROTOCOL
In order to address the weaknesses of the Zheng et al. [27] protocol, in this section we propose an improved version of this protocol. The main idea is involving all protocol parties in the randomizing of the transferred messages. In addition, the only reliable source for the time could be the server. Hence, the timestamp is introduced by the server in the protocol and it will also verify the round trip time validity. The proposed protocol's representation is depicted in Fig. 5 and proceeds as below:
1) To start a session, the reader generates a fresh random number R r and sends Query message along R r to the server. 2) The server generates a fresh random number R s and sends its current timestamps T 1 along R s to the reader.
3) The reader sends T 1 along R r and R s to the tag. 4) Once the tag receives the message, it generates a random number R t and computes N 1 = h(ID k ⊕ R r T 1 R t R s ) and sends it along R t to the reader. 5) When the reader receives the message, it computes N 2 = h(RID k ⊕ R r N 1 ⊕ R s ) and sends it along with N 1 and R t to the server. 6) Upon receipt the message, at the first the server compares the current timestamps T 2 with the sent = N 3 . If it is so, the server is authenticated. It also means that the tag has been authenticated by the server. Hence the tag is also authenticated. On successful authentication, the reader forwards the received N 4 to the tag. = N 4 . If it is so, the server is authenticated. It also means that the reader has been authenticated by the server. Hence the reader is also authenticated.
V. SECURITY PROOF OF THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
In this section, first in informalized manner we show that the security correctness of proposed protocol and then based on Scyther tool [33] which is an automatic formal prover, prove the improved protocol has perfect security against all known active and passive attacks.
A. INFORMAL PROOF OF SECURITY 1) RESISTANCE AGAINST DESYNCHRONIZATION ATTACK
Given that in the proposed protocol, similar to its predecessor protocol by Zheng et al. [27] , protocol parties do not update their shared values, it is not possible to desynchronize them. Hence, the proposed protocol does not suffer from the desynchronization attack.
2) Resistance against secret disclosure attack
The secret parameters in the proposed protocol are ID k and RID k . Given that any message which is transferred over a public channel is a function of these values are generated by the hash function and it is not feasible to invert a hash function in polynomial time, the adversary cannot extract secret parameters ID k and RID k in polynomial time. Hence, the proposed protocol does not suffer from a secret disclosure attack.
3) RESISTANCE AGAINST ALL KINDS OF IMPERSONATION ATTACK AND REPLAY ATTACKS
In the proposed protocol, any message which is sent to a receiver has been randomized at least by a nonce suggested by the receiver. Hence, to impersonate X ∈ {tag, reader, server} toward Y ∈ {tag, reader, server}, X should answer a challenge which is suggested by Y and the challenge is refreshed in any session. More precisely:
• To impersonate the tag, assuming that the reader and the server are legitimate, given a fresh R r and a timestamp VOLUME 7, 2019 T 1 , the adversary should generate a valid
, without the knowledge of ID k which is not feasible. However, when received R r and T 1 , any adversary can return a random pair as N 1 and R t . In the server side, the severer searches whole its records to find a match for N 1 based on R t , assuming that the |N 1 | = n, then any comparison is satisfied with the probability of 2 −n . Assuming that the server keeps the records of t tags, the success probability of the adversary on each try will be almost t2 −n and afterueries, it will be almost qt2 −n .
• To impersonate the reader, assuming that the tag and the server are legitimate, given a fresh R s and a timestamp T 1 , the adversary should generate a valid
, without the knowledge of RID k which is not feasible. However, when received R s and T 1 , any adversary can return a random value N 2 . In the server side, the severer searches whole its records to find a match for N 2 based on R r , R s and N 1 . In this case, also any comparison is satisfied with the probability of 2 −n . Assuming that the server keeps the records of r readers, the success probability of the adversary on each try will be almost r2 −n and afterueries, it will be almost qr2 −n .
• Impersonating the reader and the tag toward the server will not be easier than impersonating any of them.
• To impersonate the server, assuming that the tag and the reader are legitimate, given a fresh R r and R t and any desired timestamps T 1 and value of R s , the adversary should generate a valid N 3 = h(RID k ⊕ R s R r ) and
, without the knowledge of RID k and ID k which is not feasible. However, when received the reader response, any adversary can return random values as N 3 and N 4 . However, such random values are accepted by the tag and the reader each one by the probability of 2 −n . Hence, the adversary's advantage to impersonate the server is upper bounded by 2 −n on each query and q2 −n afterueries. All in all, the proposed protocol is secure against impersonation and replay attacks.
4) RESISTANCE AGAINST TRACEABILITY ATTACKS
To apply traceability attack, the adversary should find a connection between the transferred messages over the public channel and the identity of a protocol party or transferred messages in previous sessions. However, in the proposed protocol, any message which is transferred over a public channel is generated by the hash function and has at least one fresh random number as its input. Hence, from a session to another session the adversary can see the fresh output of the hash function that cannot be connected to each other. Hence, the proposed protocol does not suffer from traceability attack.
5) RESISTANCE AGAINST AN ADVERSARY THAT CAN CONTROL THE TIME
In this paper, we showed that several protocols suffer from various attacks if the adversary can control the time of a protocol's party. However, in the proposed protocol, the only source of time is the server which is more reliable than the tag and the reader, and even if an adversary controls the time, given that it has no control over the fresh nonce introduced by the protocol's parties, it cannot apply any of the attacks suggested against those protocols. It worth to mention that attack was possible because the server contribution to the protocol randomization was only the timestamps, while in the proposed protocol, the server also randomizes the transferred messages by R s . Hence, the proposed protocol does not suffer from an adversary that can control the time and desynchronization attack.
B. FORMAL PROOF OF SECURITY
Scyther [33] is a utility for checking the security properties of a protocol which is written in Python. In this tool, the protocol roles are written in Security Protocol Description Language (spdl), and then the security claims of confidentiality and authenticity are evaluated. The role description of improved protocol in spdl language is depicted in Appendix VI. As illustrated in Fig. 6 , the Scyther tool cannot find any attacks for our proposed protocol. In addition, as shown in Table 2 , the protocol designed in this paper, unlike its predecessors, provides desired security against the attacks in the context.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigate the security of four authentication protocols which with the aim of providing security and privacy preservation in telecare medicine information system and smart campus have been proposed. Precisely, we presented reader and tag impersonation to server attack and also server impersonation to the reader attacks against Zheng et al. protocol.
Moreover, we present a new desynchronization attack against Li et al., Zhou et al. and Benssalah et al. protocols which exploits this weakness in these protocols where timestamps are generated by the mobile readers.
We also designed a protocol that, in addition to resolving all the weaknesses of the four protocols, is also safe against other known attacks. We also demonstrated in an informal and formal way that the designed protocol is safe and suitable for use in telecare medication information system and smart campus.
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